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CRACKS IN THE COST STRUCTURE OF AGENCY 
ADOPTION 
ANDREA B. CARROLL• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is no longer a secret. Domestic adoption is big business. 1 "Baby 
selling" has long been vilified and remains unlawful.2 However, a close 
examination of the cash that changes hands in the garden-variety domestic 
adoption would make it difficult for most people to tell the difference. 3 
Prospective adoptive parents pay agencies and lawyers exceptional sums to 
identify and locate birth parents that are willing to relinquish their parental 
rights.4 Hospital and delivery charges, often not covered by private 
Copyright© 2011, Andrea B. Carroll. 
• C.E. Laborde, Jr. Professor of Law, Louisiana State University, Paul M. Hebert Law 
Center. I thank the Capital University Law Review for the opportunity to present an earlier 
version of this piece at its 6th Annual Wells Conference on Adoption Law. Laura Pryor and 
Katie Rittiner (LSU Law Center Class of201 l )  provided excellent research assistance. 
1 Sandra Patton-Imani, Redefining the Ethics of Adoption, Race, Gender, and Class, 36 
LAW & Soc'y REV., 813, 827 (2002). 
2 See Tamar Lewin, At Core of Adoption Dispute Is Crazy Quilt of State Laws, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 19, 2001, at Al4; US. Embassy Report Faults Vietnam's Oversight of 
Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 2008, at A7; see also In re Adoption of Stephen, 645 
N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1014 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996); Sale of Children in Interstate and Foreign 
Commerce: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the Comm. on the 
Judiciary H of Reps., 95th Cong. (1977), available at http://poundpuplegacy.org/ 
files/4e.pdf [hereinafter Hearings]. 
3 See generally Douglas H. Reiniger, Ethical Considerations in Representing Birth 
Parents: Regulation of Adoption Expenses, in AooPTION LAW INSTITUTE 2007, at 183 (PLI 
Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. C-211, 2007); Commentary, End 
Baby Commerce, GAMBIT WEEKLY, June 10, 1999, at 7. 
4 See Laura Mansnerus, Market Puts Price Tags on the Priceless: In Search of a Child: 
The Baby Bazaar, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1998, at Al (explaining that adoption costs can 
range from $5,000 to $100,000). State laws generally permit agencies to charge service 
fees for each adoption they facilitate. See ALA. CODE§ 26-10-4. l (a) (LexisNexis 2009); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (2009); D.C. CODE§ 4-1410 (2008); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
ANN. 525/1 (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(l) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 199.590(2) (West 2006); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1200(8) (2004); MD. CODE ANN., 
FAM. LAW § 5-362(b)(2) (LexisNexis 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.275(1) 
(LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 170-8:13(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. 
ANN.§ 9:3-39. l (e) (West 2002); N. M. STAT. ANN.§ 32A-5-34(B) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. 
(continued) 
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insurance or Medicaid, are borne by families seeking to adopt. 5 
Prospective adoptive parents almost always cover fees for mental health 
counseling to birth mothers.6 Travel and incidental costs frequently 
amount to thousands of dollars. 7 Legal representation for both the adoptive 
and birth parents to finalize the placement costs a substantial sum. 8 In 
short, the expense of a domestic agency adoption can decimate a family 
budget.9 
Moreover, parents desiring to build their families through adoption are 
almost assured a long haul. Healthy, white infants are adopted so 
frequently that parents seeking such a child often wait years before finally 
becoming parents through an agency adoption.10 Still, there is no overage 
LAW§ 374(6) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. A NN.§ 48-10-103(e) (2009); Omo REV. 
CODE A NN.§ 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 0, § 7505-3.2 
(West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533 (d) (West 201 0); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-
3 1 0(F) (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. ISA, § 7- 104 (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-12 1 8  
(2007); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803(e) (LexisNexis 2009). An attorney may be paid 
additional fees by the adoptive family for services in connection with an adoption. See 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-l 1 4(D) (2007); COLO. REV. STAT. § 1 9-5-213(l)(a) (20 1 0); FLA. 
STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2)(f)(l )  (West 2005); LA. CH. CODE ANN. art. 1200(8)(8) (2004); 
MISS. CODE ANN.§ 43-1 5-23(4) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1 70-B : l 3 (1)  (LexisNexis 
20 10); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 48-1 0-103(a) (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 1 4-15-10(1 ) 
(2009); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3 107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); 23 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 2533(d) (West 201 0); s.c. CODE ANN. § 63-9-3 1 0(F) (201 0); TE NN. CODE 
ANN. § 36-l-109(a)(l )(B)(i) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 76-7-203(l )(a) (LexisNexis 2008); 
W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-22-803(e) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.913 ( 1 )  (West 
2008 & Supp. 20 10). 
5 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 57 (2004); UNIF. AooPTION ACT § 7-103(a)(3), 9 U.L.A. 126 
( 1 999). 
6 See UNIF. AooPTION ACT § 7-1 03(a)(4), 9 U.L.A. 1 26; see also Adoption of Stephen, 
645 N.Y.S.2d at 1015 (finding that payment of counseling expenses was proper and 
reasonable). 
7 See, e.g., Adoption of Stephen, 645 N.Y.S.2d at 101 4. 
8 Reiniger, supra note 3, at 1 88; see also Katy Ruth Klinke, Note, The Baby M 
Controversy: A Class Distinction, 1 8  OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1 13 ,  1 48 (1 993) (discussing a 
lawyer who received $ 1 84,000 for arranging surrogacy contracts in 1 983). 
9 Fronting tens of thousands of dollars in costs for an adoption can be difficult or 
impossible, even for families who can reasonably support an adopted child. See Klinke, 
supra note 8, at 1 48; Lewin, supra note 2, at A l 4. The cost of raising a child is borne over 
a lengthy period. Adoption expenses, however, often rival an average American family's 
annual income. See Klinke, supra note 8, at 1 48; Lewin, supra note 2, at A l 4. IOM ansnerus, supra note 4, at A l .  
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of infants available for adoption in this country. 11 Infants do not typically 
wait to find suitable adoptive parents.12 Quite the contrary. This state of 
affairs is deceptive because it creates an inappropriate level of societal 
comfort with America's private adoption system. If parents wanting to 
adopt will pay whatever is required, and most babies in need of adoption 
find adoptive homes, then what is the problem? Does the cost structure of 
the domestic adoption scheme need to b e  modified at all? 
This article argues that private adoption, viewed purely from an 
economic standpoint, is broken. A near free market has taken hold.13 And 
that free market substantially prejudices prospective adoptive parents.14 
Children are being adopted, but adoption needs to be less costly. 
Legislatures should act to cap adoption expenses, provide remedies for 
prospective adoptive parents in failed adoptions, and offer better tax 
incentives to prospective adoptive parents. A more active regulation of the 
agency-adoption market would aid prospective adoptive parents, likely 
spur more Americans to adopt, and thereby, increase the likelihood of a 
positive adoption outcome for adoptees. 
II. CAPPING ADOPTION EXPENSES 
The purchase and sale of children today remains, as it has for many 
years, unlawful in every American state.15 Many states regulate the sale of 
11 Id at A l 6. 
12 Id. 
13 See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 
7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 324 (1978) (arguing, controversially, that an experimental move 
toward a free market in adoption would serve to rectify the supply and demand mismatch 
plaguing the system); Richard A. Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 
B.U. L. REv. 59, 7 1  (1987) (arguing, nearly ten years after the "Baby Shortage" piece, that 
legal schemes allowing the payment of substantial sums to birth mothers are really sales in 
disguise). 
14 See Landes & Posner, supra note 13, at 71. 
15 See WILLIAM MEEZAN, SANFORD KATZ & EVA MANOFF Russo, ADOPTIONS WITHOUT 
AGENCIES: A STUDY OF INDEPENDENT ADOPTIONS 182 (1978); Vanessa s. Browne-Barbour, 
Bartering for Babies: Are Preconception Agreements in the Best Interests of Children?, 26 
WHITTIER L. REv. 429, 473 (2004). Criminal statutes punish the practice in thirty-three 
states. See ALA. CODE§ 26-lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 273(a) (West 
2008); COLO. REV. STAT.§ 19-5-213(1)-{2) (2010); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.212(l)(c) (West 
2005 & Supp. 2010); GA. CODE ANN . § 19-8-24 (2010); IDAHO CODE ANN . § 18-1511 
(2004); IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-46-l-9(a) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 600.9(1)(c) (West 
2001 & Supp. 2010); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 199.493 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 14:286 (2004); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-603 (LexisNexis 2002); MASS. GEN. 
(continued) 
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LAWS ANN. ch. 210, § l l A (West 2007 & Supp. 2010); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN . 
§ 710.54(1) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 259.55 (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-
15-23 (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 568.175(1) (West 1999); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 42-7-105(3) 
(2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.287-288 (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-
39. l (d) (West 2002); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW§§ 374(6), 389(2) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. 
STAT. ANN . § 48-10-102 (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-31-05 (1997 & Supp. 2009); 
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 866 (West 2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 4305 (West 1983); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1060 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 25-6-4.1-4.2 (2004); TENN. 
CODE ANN.§ 36-1-109 (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ 25.08 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203(2) (LexisNexis 2008); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-1218 (2007); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.64.030 (West 2010); w. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803 
(LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.24 (West 2005). A dditionally, fourteen states 
denounce the practice through case law. See People v. Daniel, 241 Cal. Rptr. 3d 3, 5-6 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1987) (convicting the defendant of "attempted sale of a person" for 
demanding $90,000 in exchange for consent to the adoption of his seventeen-month-old 
daughter); Adoption House, Inc. v. P.M., No. 02-12-071N, 00-37796, 2003 WL 23354141, 
at *7-10 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 9, 2003) (holding that a fee paid to a biological parent or a fee 
charged by an adoption agency for more than the reasonable costs associated with an 
adoption constitutes "unjustifiable conduct" depriving a court of jurisdiction to terminate 
parental rights); Douglas v. State, 438 S.E.2d 361, 361 (Ga. 1994) (offering an automobile 
in exchange for the biological mother's consent to adoption violated a statute making it 
unlawful to induce parents to part with their children); In re Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485, 
488-49 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989) (holding that consent was fraudulently obtained where adoptive 
parents paid the birth mother $10,000 to cover medical expenses without being aware of 
what the expenses were); In re Adoption of Baby Boy M., 18 P.3d 304, 305 (Kan. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that a trial court erred in ordering adoptive parents to reimburse Medicaid 
for payments for birth mother's expenses where no law required them to do so); State v. 
Roberts, 471 So. 2d 900, 901-02 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the biological mother 
violated the statute by selling her child to a police officer in Louisiana for $3,000); State v. 
Runkles, 605 A.2d 111, 120 (Md. 1992) (finding that a mother who was persuaded by her 
boyfriend to relinquish her child to the boyfriend's father for $4,000 did not violate the 
statute because she did not know of the payment); Doe v. Kelly, 307 N.W.2d 438, 440--41 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the defendant violated the statute by offering to 
relinquish her child for $5,000); Balouch v. State, 938 So. 2d 253, 258 (Miss. 2006) 
(holding that the defendant violated the statute by offering to give up her child for $5,000); 
State v. Daugherty, 744 S.W.2d 849, 850 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that the defendant 
was guilty of trafficking of children for offering to pay $1,000 for the adoption of a child); 
Gray v. Maxwell, 293 N.W.2d 90, 95 (Neb. 1980) (finding relinquishment of a child done 
in consideration of promise to pay a sum of money in excess of legitimate expenses against 
public policy); In re Adoption of Baby Boy P., 700 N.Y.S.2d 792, 798 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 
1999) (reducing excessive agency fees and disallowing both attorney fees for services 
provided to the natural father and car maintenance expenses); In re Adoption of Stephen, 
(continued) 
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children b y  criminalizing the transfer of "anything of value" in connection 
with an adoptive placement.16 Still, the cost of agency adoption is 
staggering-frequently in excess of $40,00017-with nearly all states 
excepting from their baby-selling prohibitions agency fees, 18 medical 
645 N.Y.S.2d 1012, 1014-15 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1996) (holding that living expenses paid to a 
birth mother and rent by adoption agency violated statute); In re Adoption of Alyssa, L.B., 
501 N.Y.S.2d 595, 596-97 (N.Y. Sur. Ct. 1986) (holding that expenses are limited to those 
"incidental to the birth or care of the adoptive child, the pregnancy or care of the adoptive 
child's mother, or the placement or adoption of the child" but cannot include an automobile 
for the birth mother); Jn re Adoption of P.E.P., 407 S.E.2d 505, 510 (N.C. 1991) (finding 
payment of fees including travel expenses, medical expenses of the parent, six month lease 
of an apartment, weekly stipend for three months, and attorney fees violated the statute); In 
re Baby Girl D., 517 A.2d 925, 927-28 (Pa. 1986) (allowing adoptive parents to pay only 
expenses related to the care of the child); DeJesus v. State, 889 S.W.2d 373, 375-77 (Tex. 
App. 1994) (upholding the defendant's conviction for the sale of a child because over 
$10,000 in payments were made outside of the confines of the statute); Thacker v. State, 
889 S.W.2d 380, 384-86 (Tex. App. 1994) (finding that a mother and an attorney violated 
the statute when the attorney paid the mother a total of $12,000 for her five children). 
16 See, e.g., ARI.z. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-114(C) (2007) (prohibiting compensation for 
consenting to place a child for adoption). But see id § 8-114(A) (allowing a court to 
approve any reasonable and necessary expenses incurred in connection with the adoption, 
including "costs for medical and hospital care and examinations for the mother and child, 
counseling fees, legal fees, agency fees, living expenses, and any other costs the court finds 
reasonable and necessary''). See also IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-l-9(a) (West 2004) 
(establishing the transfer of property for consent to adoption as a Class D felony). But see 
id § 35-46-1-9(b) (allowing payment for attorney's fees, hospital and medical expenses, 
agency fees, birth parent counseling, costs of housing, utilities, phone service, or any 
additional itemized necessary living expense for birth mother during the second or third 
trimester of pregnancy and not more than six weeks after birth, maternity clothing, travel 
expenses that relate to the pregnancy or adoption, and actual wages lost). 
17 Costs of Adoption, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY FACTSHEETS FOR 
FAMILIES (Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Washington, D.C.), June 2004, at 2, available 
at http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/s_cost/s_costs.pdf. It is not at all uncommon for 
complicated domestic adoptions to approach $100,000. Mansnerus, supra note 4, at Al. 
18 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (2009) (stating a service fee may be 
charged by an adoption agency "for each adoption in an amount not exceeding the cost of 
services rendered, to be paid by the adopting parent or parents"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-
212l(a) (2005) ("Except as otherwise authorized by law, no person shall request, receive, 
give or offer to give any consideration in connection with an adoption, or a placement for 
adoption, other than: ( 1) reasonable fees for legal and other professional services rendered 
in connection with the placement or adoption not to exceed customary fees for similar 
services by professionals of equivalent experience and reputation where the services are 
(continued) 
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19 20 . h h l' . 21 d expenses, counseling expenses, b1rt -mot er- ivmg expenses, an 
legal fees.22 States allow these payments in connection with an adoptive 
performed . . .  (2) reasonable fees in the state of Kansas of a licensed child-placing 
"
) agency . . . . . 
19 See ALA. CODE§ 26-lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-114(A) 
(2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-9-206(c) (2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2)(b) (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-13(c) (2010); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. § 18-1511 (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN . 52514 (West 2010); IND. CODE 
ANN. § 35-46-1-9(b) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(4) (2005); LA. CHILD. 
CODE ANN. art. 1200(B)(l) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN . tit. 18, § 9-306(a)(3) (1998); MD. 
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(b)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2006); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 710.54(3)(b) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 259.55(1) (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. 
§ 43-15-23(4) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1)(1) (West 2003); MONT. CODJ? ANN. 
§ 42-7-101(1) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REv. 
STAT. ANN. § 170-B:l3(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.l(e) (West 
2002); N.M. STAT. ANN . § 32A-5-34(B)(2) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) 
(McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 48-10-103(e) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-
15-lO(l)(c) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(C)(l}-(2) (West 2005 & Supp. 
2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN . tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(B)(l)(b) (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 109.311(1) (2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.§ 2533(d)(l) (West 2010); s.c. CODE ANN. 
§ 63-9-310(F)(l) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-l-109(B)(i) (2010); TEX. PENAL CODE 
ANN. § 25.08(b)(2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
203(1)(a)(iii)(A)(IIl) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a)(2) (2002); VA. 
CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1218 (2007); WASH. REv. CODE.ANN.§ 9A.64.030(2)(f)(West 2010); w. 
VA. CODE ANN.§ 48-22-803(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1)(£}-(g) 
(West 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
20 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-l 14(A) (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728 
(West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-l-9(b)(4) (West 2004); LA. CH. CODE ANN . art. 
1200(B)(5) (2004); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a)(2) (1998); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. § 710.54(5) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN . § 259.55(1) (West 2007); MISS. 
CODE ANN.§ 43-15-117(4) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1)(2) (West 2003); MONT. 
CODE ANN.§ 42-7-lOl(l)(g) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § l 70-B:13(1)(a) (LexisNexis 
2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.l(e) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B)(3) 
(West 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 48-10-l03(e) (2009); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, 
§ 7505-3.2(B)(l)(c) (West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d)(3) (West 2010); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-l-l09(a)(l)(B)(i) (2010); Tux. PENAL CODE ANN. § 25.08(b)(2) 
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203(l)(a)(iii)(A)(V) (LexisNexis 
2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-l03(a)(3) (2002); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1218 (2007); 
WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.913(1)(a)-(b) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
21 See ALA. CODE§ 26-lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN.§ 8-l14(A) 
(2007); CAL. FAM. CODE § 8610(a) (West 2004); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728(c) 
(West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.097(2)(a) (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-1515(1) 
(continued) 
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placement to facilitate adoption. 23 The theory is that adoption will remain 
a viable alternative for women facing unplanned pregnancies so long as it 
(2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.l(a) (West 2010); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46-1-
9(b)(5) (West 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2)(d) (West 2001 & Supp. 2010); KAN. 
STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(6) (2005); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 1200(8)(7) (2004); ME. 
R.Ev. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 9-306(a)(6) (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3Xd) 
(West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. §  259.55(4) (West 2007); MISS. CODE ANN. §  43-15-117(4) 
(2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1)(5) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §  42-7-IOl(l)(h) 
(2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 170-B:l3(1)(d) (LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-39.l(e) (West 2002); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(B)(4) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2010); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §  48-10-103(a)(4) (2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-lO(l)(e) (2009); 
Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(CX9) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, § 7505-3.2(B)(l)(e) (West 2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-310(F)(l) (2010); TENN. 
CODE ANN. § 36-l-109(aXl)(B) (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203(1)(aXiii)(A)(VI) 
(LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a)(4) (2002); VA. CODE ANN. § 63.2-
1218 (2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. §  48.913(l)(i) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
22 See ALA. CODE § 26-10A-34(b) (LexisNexis 2009); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
l 14(A) (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. §  9-9-22l(c) (2009); Cow. R.Ev. STAT. § 19-5-213(1)(a) 
(2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 928(b) (2009); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.097(2)(d) (West 
2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. §  16-1515(1) (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.l(g) (West 
2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-2121(a)(l) (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.590(6)(a) 
(West 2006); LA. CHILD CODE ANN. art. 1200(B)(8) (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, 
§ 9-306(a)(l) (1998); Mo. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 5-362(b)(2)(i) (LexisNexis 2006); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §  710.54(3)(f) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55(1) (West 
2007); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-15-117(4) (2009); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.075(1X4) (West 
2003); MONT. CODE ANN. §  42-7-lOl(l)(i) (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §  170-B:l3(1)(a) 
(LexisNexis 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §  9:3-39.l(eX3) (West 2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. §  32A-
5-34(B)(6) (2003); N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 374(6) (McKinney 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 48-10-103(a)(6) (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-15-lO(l)(b) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3107.055(C)(3) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OK.LA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-
3.2(B)(l)(a) (West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2533(d)(4) (West 2010); S.C. CODE 
ANN. §  63-9-310(F)(5) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN. §  36-l-109(a)(l)(B) (2010); TEX. PENAL 
CODE ANN. § 25.08(bX2) (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
203(l)(a)(iii)(A)(I) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 7-103(a)(6) (2002); VA. 
CODE ANN. §  63.2-1218 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §  9A.64.030(2)(f)(West 2010); w. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 48-22-803(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 48.913(1)(h) 
(West 2008 & Supp. 2010). 
23 See Reiniger, supra note 3, at 188 (arguing that the purpose of "expense statutes" is 
to make adoption "a financially neutral option for the birth mother"). 
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remains a financially neutral transaction for them.24 Not all allowable 
expenses serve that purpose, however. Indeed, some state laws provide a 
rather generous possibility of profit for birth mothers choosing adoption.25 
The harms of a private-adoption scheme, which are startlingly close to 
sanctioning a free market in infants, have been chronicled elsewhere and 
are relatively well accepted. 26 This piece focuses solely on the need to 
reduce exorbitant expenses for prospective adoptive parents. The first step 
in so doing is a small and simple one to take: expense caps on fees paid in 
connection with agency adoptions should be expanded dramatically. 
A number of states already cap living expenses paid to birth mothers in 
connection with an adoption to small sums ranging from $1,500 to 
$5,000.27 But states still have much further to go.28 The vast majority of 
24 See FAQ's A bout Birth Mother Expenses, ACADEMY OF CALIFORNIA ADoPTION 
LAWYERS, http://www.acal.org/birth.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2010). The Academy of 
California Adoption Lawyers describes payments from adoptive parents to birth parents as 
for the purpose of making adoption a .. financially neutral option for the birth mother" rather 
than a money-making opportunity. Id.; see also Hearings, supra note 2, at 17-18 
(testimony of William Acosta, Deputy Comm'r, Div. of Servs., N. Y. Dep't of Soc. Servs. ); 
Candice M. Zierdt, Compensation for Birth Mothers: A Challenge to the Adoption Laws, 23 
LOY. U. CHI. L. J. 25, 62 (1991); Jennifer L. Watson, Comment, Growing a Baby for Sale or 
Merely Renting a Womb: Should Surrogate Mothers Be Compensated for Their Services?, 6 
WHITTIER J. CHILD. & FAM. ADvoc. 529, 539 (2007). 
25 See Andrea B. Carroll, Re-Regulating the Baby Market: A Call for a Ban on Payment 
of Birth Mother Living Expenses, 59 KAN. L. REv. 285, 290-95 (2011 ). 
26 See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849 
(1987) (describing multiple harms to personhood and society flowing from the 
commodification of infants, including the exacerbation of existing class, race, and gender 
divisions); see also Barbara K. Rothman, Reproductive Technology and the 
Commodification of Life, in EMBRYOS, ETHICS AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS: EXPLORING THE 
NEW RE PRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES 95, 96-97 (Elaine H. Baruch et al. eds., 1988) (arguing 
that commodification in the surrogacy context affects women's self-respect and self-worth). 
27 Three states provide specific dollar caps. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c 
(West 2004) ($1,500 cap); Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.055(CX9) (West 2005 & Supp. 
2010) ($3,000 cap); WIS. STAT. ANN . § 48.913(l )(i) (West 2008 & Supp. 2010) ($5,000 
cap). More than twenty others limit expenses to those adjudged "reasonable" or 
"necessary." See ALA. CODE § 26-lOA-34 (LexisNexis 2009); ARI.z. REV. STAT. ANN . § 8-
l 14(A) (2007); CAL. PENAL CODE§ 273(b) (West 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.097(2) (West 
2005); IDAHO CODE ANN.§ 16-1515(1) (2009); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN . 525/4.l (a) (West 
2010); IND. CODE ANN.§ 35-46- l -9(b) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 59-2121(a) (2005); 
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 710.54(3) (West 2002); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.55 (West 
2007); MISS. CODE ANN.§ 43-15-117(4) (2009); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 42-7-101(1) (2009); 
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states do not place any specific dollar limitations on birth mother living 
expenses.29 Moreover, prospective adoptive parents under this "living 
expenses" umbrella often shoulder expenses tangentially related to the 
birth and adoptive placement.30 In Massachusetts for instance, prospective 
adoptive parents may legally pay a birth mother up to $980 per month in 
rent, utilities, food, and clothing and an additional $500 monthly for 
"educational, vocational, recreational, or religious services."31 The 
allowance for such a breadth of payments demonstrates an adoption 
scheme run amuck. The effect of such loose regulation of birth mother 
living expenses is predictable and real: birth mothers flock to states that 
liberally sanction the payment of living expenses and provide the 
opportunity to gain financially through an adoptive placement. 32 Capping 
the payment of living expenses to very small sums closely related to the 
NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(3) (LexisNexis 2010); N.H. R..Ev. STAT. ANN. § l 70-
B:l 3(1) (LexisNexis 2010); N.M. STAT. ANN.§ 32A-5-34(B) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
10, § 7505-3.2 (West 2009); s.c. CODE ANN.§ 63-9-310(F) (2010); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 36-
1-109 (2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-203 (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, 
§ 7-103(a) (2002); VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1218 (2007). 
28 See generally Carroll, supra note 25 (arguing for a nationwide ban on payment of 
birth mother living expenses). 
29 See Regulation of Private Adoption Expenses: Summary o f  State Laws, CHILD 
WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY STATE STATUTES (Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 
Washington, D.C.), Mar. 2010, at 3, available at http://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide 
/laws_policies/statutes/expensesall.pdf (explaining that only a small number of states place 
actual dollar figures on expense caps). 
30 See Carroll, supra note 25, at 28-29 (describing the manner in which allowing the 
payment of birth mother living expenses results in arguments for covering cars, massages, 
and health club expenses). 
31 Adoptive Families Magazine, Adoption Laws by State, THE ADOPTION GUIDE (2008), 
http://www.adoptivefamilies.corn/adoptionlaws. 
32 See, e.g., Adoption House, Inc. v. P.M., No. 02-12-07TN, 00-37796, 2003 WL 
23354141 (Del. Fam. Ct. Oct. 9, 2003). In Adoption House, a birth mother refused to agree 
to adoption in Pennsylvania because at that time Pennsylvania law did not permit the 
payment of birth mother living expenses. See id. at *3. She decided instead on a couple 
from New York, a state that allowed living expenses. See id. Two years later, when the 
same birth mother sought an adopting couple for another child, she decided first on a couple 
from Louisiana, who later changed their minds at the hospital after learning the child was 
biracial. Id. at *4. The birth mother finally decided on a Delaware couple because 
Delaware state law permitted the payment ofliving expenses. See id at *5; see also Zierdt, 
supra note 24, at 31-32. 
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birth and placement of a child, like Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Ohio have 
done, 33 is a step all states should pursue. 
However, caps on expenses paid to a birth mother in connection with 
an adoption are but one piece of the puzzle of reducing the cost of 
domestic adoption. Limiting the fees charged by adoption agencies is 
another important step. These fees are far less regulated under state law, 
and vary quite substantially.34 Most agencies charge around $15,000 for 
their fees alone in brokering an adoption, with no guarantee to prospective 
adoptive parents that a placement will take place after the payment is made 
and no duty on the agency's part to recompense the fee if a placement is 
not made.35 
Certainly, any suggestion that private agencies should be hamstrung by 
fee caps is a controversial one, particularly to free market devotees. 36 
However, while some fear that the adoption market is moving more 
towards a free one, it is not there yet.37 The fact that adoption is such big 
business38 demonstrates the problem precisely. Even non-profit players in 
adoption post huge revenues and salaries for their top employees. 39 A 
2004 Forbes report, for instance, reported that Catholic Charities USA-a 
non-profit agency heavily involved in domestic adoption-brought in non­
profit earnings after expenses of nearly $3 billion, with the top earner 
33 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 45a-728c (West 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3107.055(C)(9) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 48.913(l )(i) (West 2008 & 
Supp. 2010). 
34 Lois Gilman & Susan Freivalds, Adopting Smart: How Adoption Works and How 
Much It Costs, ADOPTIVE FAMILIES, http://www.adoptivefamilies.com/adoption.php (last 
visited Oct. 28, 2010) (detailing variation in costs of a domestic agency adoption). 
35 See, e.g., Domestic Adoption Costs, ADOPTIONSERVICES.ORG, http://www.adoptionser 
vices.org/adoption/adoption_costs_domestic.htm (last visited Oct. 28, 2010) (describing 
typical fees associated with domestic adoption). 
36 See generally Posner, supra note 13 (discussing a free market in babies). 
37 See Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Approaching Surrogate Motherhood: Reconsidering 
Difference, 26 VT. L. R.Ev. 407, 418 (2002). The wealth of baby-selling statutes make it 
clear that Landes and Posner's 1978 free market proposal has not been wholly embraced by 
American states. Compare Landes & Posner, supra note 13 (presenting the 1978 free 
market proposal), with sources cited supra note 15 (detailing state statutes prohibiting baby 
selling). 
38 See source cited supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
39 William P. Barrett, America's Most (and Least) Efficient Charities, FORBES.COM 
(Nov. 24, 2004, 2:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/finance/lists/14/2004/LIR.jhtml ?passLis 
tld= l 4&pass Y ear=2004&passListType= Misc&datatype=Misc&uniqueld=CH003. 
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making $116,362 annually.40 Much of those adoption agency earnings 
come, of course, from agency fees prospective adoptive parents pay for the 
brokerage of an adoptive match.41 In addition, many of the reasons for 
limiting expenses prospective adoptive parents may pay a b irth mother in 
connection with an adoption-reducing the infringement on a birth 
mother's voluntariness and more strongly encouraging quality parents to 
consider adoption42----cry out for state interference in regulating agency 
fees as well. As long as state law prohibits baby selling and a free market 
of infant sale is not the norm, states should pursue fee limitations and other 
reasonable means of modifying the cost structure of the adoption scheme 
in a manner that actually serves to foster adoption. 
Ill. PROVIDING GREATER REMEDIES FOR FAILED ADOPTIONS 
The financial risk of a domestic agency adoption is sobering. 
Adoptive parents can expect that a successful agency adoption will carry a 
hefty price tag. 43 And there is no doubt adoptive parents would willingly 
pay that price, and more, for the guarantee of a child.44 Of course, agency 
adoption provides no such guarantee.45 In fact, domestic-agency-adoption­
failure rates are rather alarming.46 No official or governmental statistics 
track failure rates with precision,47 but adoption insiders estimate that as 
many as half of prospective adoptive families experience at least one failed 
match before finalizing an adoption.48 In eighty percent of the cases in 
40 Id. 
41 See Domestic Adoption Costs, supra note 35 (noting that the agency service fee is 
typically the largest fee a potential adopter will pay). 
42 See Carroll, supra note 25, at 31-34. 
43 See sources cited supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
44 LAURA BEAUVAIS-GoDWIN & RAYMOND GODWIN, THE COMPLETE ADOPTION BOOK: 
EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW TO AooPT A CmLD 16 (3d ed. 2005). 
45 See id. at xi. 
46 See Susan Scherreik, Adoption: Now There's the Cyber-Stork, BUSINESS WEEK, Aug. 
14, 2000, at 134E2. 
47 See Katherine Q. Seelye, Specialists Report Rise in Adoptions that Fail, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 24, 1998, at A14 (stating that there are no exact national statistics available on failed 
adoptions). 
48 See Scherreik, supra note 46, at 134E2 (estimating a failure rate of between twenty­
five and fifty percent); Dan Gearino, Money, Hope Lost in Failed Adoptions, QUAD-CITY 
nMES (Feb. 21, 2006, 12:00 AM), http://www.qctimes.com/news/local/article_ 4fd32e38-
7947-5759-9d40-8c6f2948e2cc.htrnl (reporting that a survey conducted by Adopted 
Families m agazine found that twenty-nine percent of readers had a failed adoption). 
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which birth mothers create adoption plans with prospective adoptive 
families or agencies, birth mothers ultimately choose to parent their 
children themselves.49 Emotionally distraught adoptive parents often find 
themselves financially devastated also50 because state law provides few 
remedies for prospective adoptive parents who become parties to a failed 
adoption.51 
A. Allowing Recoupment from Birth Mothers 
The problem stems largely from the fact that adoptive parents 
generally have no one from whom to recoup expenses paid in connection 
with a failed adoption.52 Agency-drafted adoption contracts nearly always 
provide that all fees prospective adoptive parents pay their agencies in 
connection with an adoption are wholly non-refundable. 53 Moreover, 
agencies often arrange for prospective adoptive parents to directly pay 
49 See Mansnerus, supra note 4, at Al6; see also Steven Pressman, The Baby Brokers, 
CAL. LAW., July 1991, at 30, 34, 105. 
50 See, e.g., Juman v. Louise Wise Servs., 663 N.Y.S.2d 483, 489 (Sup. Ct. 1 997) 
(prohibiting a cause of action allowing adoptive parents to recover for emotional distress); 
see also Pressman, supra note 49, at 34 (describing a couple that spent $4,000 on a birth 
mother's expenses before finding out that she agreed to place the child with another 
family). 
51 See, e.g., Engstrom v. State, 461 N.W.2d 309, 3 1 6-19 (Iowa 1 990) (holding that pre­
adoptive parents have no implied cause of action under government statutes, no actionable 
malpractice claim, and no deprivation of property claim). 
52 Because birth mothers may not terminate parental rights in advance of the child's 
birth, see, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1 106(c) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1 27.070(1) (LexisNexis 2010), the vast majority of expenses are paid by prospective 
adoptive parents before the birth. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 8-l 14(B) (2007); CAL. FAM. 
CODE§ 8610(a) (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 63.132 ( 1 )  (West 2005); IDAHO CODE ANN. 
§ 16- 1 5 1 5  (2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 7 1 0.54(7)(a) (West 2002); Mo. ANN. STAT. 
§ 453.075(1) (West 2003); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN.§ l 70-B:19(V) (LexisNexis 20 1 0); N.M. 
STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-34(A) (2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. IO, § 7505-3 .2(A) (West 2009); 
S.C. CODE ANN. § 63-9-740(A) (20 1 0); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-l-l l 6(b)( 16)(B) (2010); 
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 788-6-140(2) (LexisNexis 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1 5A, § 3-702(1 )  
(2002) (describing the process for reporting expenses, most of which are paid before the 
birth of the child). 
53 See, e.g., Agency Policies, ADOPTION ASSOCIATES, INC., http://www.adoptassoc.com/ 
about/agency_policies/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2010); see also Kurt Mundorff, Children as 
Chattel: Invoking the Thirteenth A mendment to Reform Child Welfare, 1 CARDOZO PUB. L. 
POL'Y & ETHICS 13 1 ,  135-36 (2003). 
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certain fees to third party service providers such as doctors or hospitals. 54 
Such an arrangement insulates agencies from reimbursing expenses that 
never passed through their hands. 55 Likewise, third party service providers 
who have provided the service for which they are paid owe no duty to 
reimburse adoptive parents once an adoption fails. 56 Prospective adoptive 
parents are therefore highly unlikely to recover any monies paid in 
connection with an adoption from either their own agency or any person 
who provided a service related to the adoption. 
If anyone owes a duty of reimbursement to prospective adoptive 
parents, it should be the birth mother who received housing, medical, and 
other benefits and chose not to complete her adoption plan. Still, state law 
generally refuses to restore the parties to their original positions by 
requiring birth mothers to reimburse prospective adoptive parents for 
expenses they paid in the wake of a failed adoption. 57 For most 
jurisdictions, it is simply a matter of public policy. 58 Absent evidence of 
some fraud perpetrated by the birth mother,59 reimbursement orders are 
54 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-13(c) (2010); IOWA CODE ANN. § 600.9(2) (West 
2001 & Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN . § 259.55 (West 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 170-B:l 3(I) (LexisNexis 2010); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 14-15-10(1) (2009); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. § 3107.055(C) (West 2005 & Supp. 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7505-3.2(B) 
(West 2009); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN . § 2533(d) (West 2010) (providing statutorily 
approved payments to third party service providers that must be reported to the court); see 
also Zierdt, supra note 24, at 34. 
55 18 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
§ 52:38 (4th ed. 2001). 
56 Id. 
57 See, e.g., A.L. v. P.A., 517 A.2d 494, 498 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1986) (holding 
that adoptive parents cannot recover any out-of-pocket expenses spent on the adoptive child 
while in the adoptive parents' custody if the birth parents breach the adoption contract and 
regain control of the child). 
58 See id.; see also Commentary, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that even in successful 
agency adoptions, states scrutinize payments, but exercise "very little oversight in 
determining what is 'reasonable"'); Gabriel Escobar, Lawyer's Kidnap Case Spotlights 
Louisiana Adoption Laws, WASH. POST, Nov. 16, 1998, at Cl ("[J]ust how carefully 
expenses are scrutinized [by state district judges] is an open question."). 
59 Where it is clear that a birth mother has perpetrated a fraud on prospective adoptive 
parents, state law protects the aggrieved parties rather well. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 273(c) (West 2008) (making it a misdemeanor for any parent to obtain financial benefit 
with the intent either not to complete the adoption or to consent to the adoption); 720 ILL. 
COMP. STAT. ANN. 525/4.1 (West 2010) (allowing reimbursement when a natural parent 
either knew she was not pregnant or accepted payments from more than one adoptive 
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considered too much of a burden to impose on a likely poor woman in 
desperate circumstances.60 As a result, prospective adoptive parents are 
almost certain not to recover any monies they pay birth parents in 
connection with a planned adoption that fails. 
However, not all states have chosen such insulation for birth mothers 
who receive money from prospective adoptive parents and fail to follow 
through with an adoption plan. Idaho law statutorily requires that a court 
order a birth parent withdrawing from an adoption to 
reimburse the adoptive or prospective adoptive parents for 
all adoption expenses including, but not limited to, all 
medical fees and costs and all legal fees and costs, and all 
other reasonable costs and expenses including, but not 
limited to, expenses for food and clothing incurred by the 
adoptive or prospective adoptive parents in connection 
with the care and maintenance of the child while the child 
was living with the adoptive or prospective adoptive 
parents.61 
Other states should consider Idaho's solution. It appropriately balances the 
risk of a failed adoption between prospective adoptive parents and birth 
parents. More importantly, the result of the Idaho rule-repayment to 
family); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-46- 1 -9.5 (West 2004) (stating a birth mother commits 
adoption deception if she knowingly or intentionally benefits from expenses when she 
knows or should know she is not pregnant, when the first adoptive parent is not aware that 
another adoptive parent is also paying expenses in an effort to adopt the same child, or 
when the mother does not intend to make an adoptive placement); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. 
§ 1 27.287(2) (LexisNexis 2010) (making it unlawful for any person to receive payment for 
medical and other necessary expenses related to the birth of a child from a prospective 
adoptive parent with the intent of not consenting to or completing the adoption of the child); 
N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §  48-10-03(d) (2009) (noting a prospective adoptive parent may seek 
to recover a payment if the parent or other person receives or accepts payment with the 
fraudulent intent to prevent the proposed adoption from being completed). 
Of course, the difficulty of proving fraud in connection with a planned placement of the 
child means that these state remedies are not typically useful to prospective adoptive 
parents. See generally John R. Maley, Wrongful Adoption: Monetary Damages as a 
Superior Remedy to Annulment for Adoptive Parents Victimized by Adoption Fraud, 20 IND. 
L. REv. 709 (1987) (proving and recovering even in cases of fraud is unlikely). 
60 See, e.g., In re Baby M., 537 A.2d 1227, 1 238-49 (N.J. 1 988). 
61 IDAHO CODE ANN. § 1 6- 1 5 1 5(2) (2009) (allowing prospective parents to failed 
adoptions to sue for expense reimbursement and damages). 
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prospective adoptive parents in a failed adoption-provides laudable 
incentives to adopt. Under such a rule, prospective adoptive parents may 
have the financial resources to try again after a failed adoption, and 
families considering agency adoption are more likely to try to adopt with 
such a risk-mitigating statute. 
B. Encouraging a Private Insurance System 
Without many state laws to protect their investment, prospective 
adoptive parents often emerge from a failed match financially devastated 
and without the resources to pursue adoption again.62 However, that poor 
outcome was not always as likely as it is today. In the late 1 990s, 
"adoption cancellation insurance" was available-an alternative that 
greatly diminished the financial risk to prospective adoptive parents of a 
failed adoption without necessitating heavy state involvement in the murky 
policies raised by state reimbursement schemes.63 Adoption cancellation 
insurance is no longer underwritten by any American carrier,64 but states 
should take steps to encourage the return of this form of coverage as a 
simple and reasonable alternative to capping adoption expenses or enacting 
reimbursement schemes. 
Adoption cancellation insurance became available in the United States 
in 1 990 but became more commonplace in 1 997 when Kemper Insurance 
Agency (a subsidiary of MBO Insurance Brokers) began underwriting 
policies.65 The goal of the underwriters offering the policies was simple­
to provide, for a fee, coverage to prospective adoptive parents for what 
they paid in connection with a planned adoption in the event a birth parent 
changed her mind and prospective adoptive parents made adoption-related 
expenditures without a successful placement.66 Kemper's policies 
typically covered expenses paid to a social worker or adoption agency to 
have an adoptive home study conducted, any fees paid to the birth mother, 
legal expenses, and even travel expenses incurred in connection with the 
planned adoption. 67 Yet, the company advertised that the policy could also 
62 s ee supra Part III.A. 
63 See CHRISTINE ADAMEC & WILLIAM L. PIERCE, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ADOPTION 19 
(2d ed. 2000). 
64 See Scherreik, supra note 46, at 1 34E2. 
65 See ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 63, at 19; see also Adoption Cancellation 
Insurance, ADOPTING.ORO, http://www.adopting.org.lmbo.html.bak (last visited Nov. 6, 
2010). 
� 9 ADAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 63, at 1 . 
67 See Adoption Cancellation Insurance, supra note 65. 
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cover other adoption-related expenses so long as "credible statistics [could] 
be collected to predict the size and frequency of future losses. "68 Kemper 
issued policies to cover expenditures ranging from $5,000 to $30,000 with 
premiums ranging from $750 to $1 ,900.69 
The coverage Kemper provided was popular. The company purported 
to receive in excess of 1 00 inquiries per month about its adoption 
cancellation plans and sold roughly 500 policies in 1 997 alone.70 By 2000, 
however, Kemper-the only insurer still underwriting adoption 
cancellation insurance-discontinued the line, announcing that providing 
the coverage had proved "unprofitable."71 
States can, and should, do more to encourage the provision of adoption 
cancellation insurance by qualified insurers. State encouragement and 
support of insurance coverage through private carriers already takes place 
under circumstances in which insurance carriers struggle with profit­
making, and thus, lean toward withdrawing from a particular line of 
business.72 Coverage for hurricane-related losses is one such well-known 
area. 73 Louisiana, for instance, has created the Insure Louisiana Incentive 
Program, which is designed to address the "crisis in availability and 
affordability of insurance" in the wake of devastating hurricane loss 
claims.74 This legislative program creates public-private partnerships and 
grants matching capital funds in an effort to guarantee adequate insurance 
coverage in a difficult market.75 Moreover, even in the murky family and 
parenting arena, many state legislatures have stepped in to require 
insurance companies to provide certain coverage they otherwise are 
68 Id. 69 Id. 10 A DAMEC & PIERCE, supra note 63, at 19. 
71  Scherreik, supra note 46, at l 34E2. Such a result is not surprising given the high 
failure rate of domestic agency adoptions. See id. 
72 s ee, e.g. , LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2362 (2004); see also CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
FEDERAL REINSURANCE FOR DISASTERS 35 (2002), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ 
ftpdocs/3 7xx/doc3 787 /09-20-FederalReinsurance.pdf (explaining that some states, like 
Florida and California, offer state-sponsored natural disaster insurance programs at low 
prices). 
73 s ee, e.g. , LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:2362. 74 Id. 
75 Id. 
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reticent to provide. Fourteen states, for instance, statutorily require that 
health insurance policies include infertility coverage.76 
In short, on occasion states do incentivize insurers to provide coverage 
that benefits their citizens. With the welfare of such an important group at 
stake-children in need of permanent, stable, and loving homes through 
adoption-states should act to incentivize private insurers to provide 
adoption cancellation insurance as well. 
IV. INCREASING TAX INCENTIVES TO ADOPT 
Even adoption agencies themselves recognize that the cost of an 
agency adoption can overwhelm families and may even prove too great for 
some families to bear.77 One popular adoption resource encourages 
prospective adoptive parents to take "cash advances from credit cards, 
second mortgages, home equity loans and special adoption loans," to 
"borrow from a life insurance policy, 40l (k) or pension plan," and even to 
"tap friends and relatives" to manage the cost of adopting a child.78 There 
is no doubt that many prospective adoptive parents will be forced to resort 
to drastic measures to make adoption affordable no matter how much it 
costs.79 However, the state and federal governments should provide more 
assistance in an effort to reduce the number of prospective adoptive parents 
for whom adoption is simply not financially feasible. The federal 
government does aid prospective adoptive parents through an adoption tax 
credit.so Additionally, a few states provide a similar, smaller credit.st 
76 ARK. CODE. ANN. §§ 23-85-137(a), 23-86-1 I S(a) (2004); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY 
CODE § 1374.55(a) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 38a-509, 38a-536 (West 2007); 
HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 431:10A-l 16.5, 432.1-604 (West 2008); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356m 
(West 2008); Mo. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-8 1 0  (LexisNexis 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 175, § 47H (West 1 998); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176A, § 8K, ch. 176B, § 41, ch. 
176G, § 4, 211 (2007); MASS. CODE REGS. 37. l l  (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-22-
1521(3)(xii) (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ l 7:48-6x(a), 17:48A-7w(a), 17:48E-35.22(a), 
17B:27-46 . l x(a) (West 2008); N.Y. lNs. LAW §§ 3 2 16( 1 3)(A), 32 21(6)(A) (McKinney 
2006); N.Y. lNs. LAW § 4303(s)( l) (McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2010); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ l 751.0 l (A)(7) (West 2009 & Supp. 2010); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-18-30(a), 27-19-23(a), 
27-20-20(a), 27-41-33(a) (2008); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 1366.001, 1366.03 (West 2009); 
W. VA . CODE § 33-25A-2(1) (LexisNexis 2006). 
77 See Gilman & Freivalds, supra note 34. 
1s Id. 
79 See id. 
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Nevertheless, the credit, even though regularly updated, is outdated and 
often does not function as it should in the situation in which adoptive 
parents are most needy-in failed adoptions.82 
For the 2009 tax year, the Internal Revenue Code provided adoptive 
parents a tax credit of $ 1 2, 1 50.83 The adoption tax credit allows parents of 
a child adopted in the tax year to claim a credit for adoption-related 
expenditures, including payments made for agency fees, attorney fees, 
travel, court costs, and the like. 84 The fact that the federal government 
provides some recognition of the financial burden borne by adoptive 
parents and attempts to incentivize adoption in light of that recognition is 
commendable. Still, the adoption tax credit is not generous enough. 
The amount of the credit--<;urrently at an all-time high85-still pales in 
comparison with the cost of an agency adoption, which frequently costs 
parents in excess of $40,000.86 In addition, the credit carries income 
phase-out limitations. 87 In short, the adoption tax credit provides too small 
a benefit to too few families. 
Moreover, the credit focuses on providing a method of recouping 
expenses to families whose adoption attempts have been successful. The 
Internal Revenue Service only recently modified their instructions on the 
adoption tax credit to clarify that the credit is available for an 
"unsuccessful" adoption.88 Even now, the instructions assume that an 
unsuccessful adoption attempt is followed by a successful one and require 
parents to combine expenses for purposes of the $ 1 2, 1 50 limitation.89 For 
81 See, e.g., Ks. STAT. ANN. § 79-32,202 (Supp. 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 27-7-22.32 
(2010). 
82 See I.R.C. § 23(b) (2006). 
83 See I.R.C. § 23(h). For adoptions taking place after January l ,  20 10, the credit will 
increase to $13, 170. William Perez, Adoption Tax Credit, ABOUT.COM, http://taxes.about 
.com/od/deductionscredits/qt/adoptioncredit.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2010). 
84 Perez, supra note 83. The adoptive parent may claim the credit in the year the 
expenses are paid if the adoption becomes final that year or in the following year if the 
adoption is finalized by then. I.R.C. § 23(a)(2). 
85 See Perez, supra note 83. 
86 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
87 I.R.C § 23(b)(2). The credit begins to phase out for married taxpayers with a 
modified adjusted gross income in excess of $ 1 82,520 and is completely phased out at a 
modified adjusted gross income of $222,520. Perez, supra note 83. 
88 Internal Revenue Service, Instructions for Form 8839, at 2 (2009), available at 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i8839.pdf. 
89 Id. at 2-3. 
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instance, if adoptive parents spend $30,000 in agency fees and birth mother 
expenses in 2008 for a failed adoption and then another $20,000 in 2009 on 
a successful adoptive placement, they are limited to claiming one credit of 
a maximum of $ 12,1 50.90 This required collation does precisely the 
opposite of what the adoption tax credit is designed to do.91 The collation 
serves to remove tax incentives for trying again after a failed adoption92-
precisely when prospective adoptive parents need the most incentive to 
push forward.93 
Finally, the adoption tax credit, warts and all, is set to become even 
less useful to adoptive parents after December 3 1, 201 1.94 The credit 
sunsets that year, and unless Congress intervenes, the credit will provide 
assistance only for a woefully inadequate $5,000 in adoption expenses.95 
Congress should act to make the adoption tax credit permanent and to 
make it more closely represent the realities facing domestic adoption. The 
credit should be more closely aligned with the actual expenses of an 
agency adoption today. Additionally, it should take into account the 
frequency with which adoptions fail and the need to  provide more 
equitable tax incentives to pursue adoption when those failures arise. 
V. A CALL TO REFORM 
The stakes of insuring a smoothly functioning agency adoption system 
are quite high. Birth mothers considering adoption deserve protection, 
particularly geared at safeguarding the voluntariness of their placement 
90 See id. at 3. 
91 See Joe Kroll, The Adoption Tax Credit: An Ethical Dilemma, NACAC.ORG, 
http://www.nacac.org/adoptalk/adoptiontaxcredit.html (last visited Nov. 6, 201 0) (citing S. 
Rep. No. 1 04-279 ( 1 996) (noting the purpose of the credit was to encourage adoption). 
92 See Liz Pulliam Weston, The Basics: $10, 000 Adoption Credit Has Many Strings, 
MSN MONEY, http://moneycentral.msn.com/content/CollegeandFamily/Raisekids/P3 7251 
.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2010) ("[I]f more than one adoption attempt doesn't succeed, or if 
you succeed after failing one or more times, your credit for all attempts is limited . . . . "). 
93 See Angela Krueger, The Effects of Adoption Disruption on the Family: How 
Adoptees and Adoptive Families Cope with a Failed Adoption, SUITE1 0 1 .COM (Oct. 14, 
2009), http://www.suite 1 O l .corn/content/the-effects-of-adoption-disruption-on-the-family­
al  58861 .  
94 See Perez, supra note 83. 
95 Id. 
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decisions.96 Prospective adoptive parents deserve protection so they are 
not taken advantage of or financially devastated after failed, or even 
successful, adoption attempts. Above all, the children that are the subject 
of adoption deserve protection and the full focus of state legislators to 
create the best possible opportunities for successful and permanent 
adoptive placements.97 
State law can do a better job of striking a balance among all these 
parties by increasing regulation of adoption-related expenditures in agency 
adoptions. Capping adoption expenses,98 providing reimbursement and 
insurance remedies in failed adoptions,99 and increasing tax incentives for 
adoption100 are small steps towards achieving the balance. Each of these 
reforms would benefit prospective adoptive parents and would also 
increase public confidence in a system that must remain distinct from a 
free market, thereby, benefiting all players involved in agency adoption. 
96 See generally Safeguarding the Rights and Well-Being of Birthparents in the 
Adoption Process, 2007 EVAN B. DONALDSON ADOPTION INST. 27-42, available at 
http::www.adoptioninstitute.org/publications/2006 _ l l _ Birthparent_ Study_ All.pdf. 
98 See Sanford N. Katz, Rewriting the Adoption Story, 5 FAM. ADvoc. 9, 1 0  (1982). 
See supra Part IL 
99 See supra Part III. A-B. 
100 See supra Part IV. 
